This paper studies the e¤ects of di¤erent types of research policy on economic growth. We …nd that while tax incentives to private research, public funding of private projects, and basic research performed at public institutions have unambiguously positive e¤ects on economic growth, performing applied research at public institutions could have negative growth e¤ects. This is due to the large crowding out of private research caused by public R&D when it competes with private …rms in the "patent race". Concerning the e¤ects of these policies on welfare, it is found that research policy can either improve or reduce consumer welfare depending on the characteristics of the policy and that an excessively high research subsidy will reduce it.
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to study the e¤ect of public research policy on both the productivity of private R&D and the growth performance of the economy. In order to do so, we will consider di¤erent research policies in the context of an endogenous growth model, where we make explicit the di¤erence between basic and applied research.
Previous literature on public intervention in the research sector is mainly undertaken from the industrial organization perspective. Papers on this area are generally concerned with the microeconomic e¤ects of research subsidies and patent policy. Some attention has been paid, however, to public research. The papers by Mamuneas and Nadiri (1996) , Ham and Mowery (1998) and Mamuneas (1999) provide microeconomic foundations for the hypothesis that public R&D causes positive external e¤ects on private productivity. In addition, Mamuneas and Nadiri (1996) …nd econometric evidence that publicly …nanced R&D induces cost savings but crowds out privately …nanced R&D investment.
There are few papers that consider public research investment from a macroeconomic perspective. Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) present a model in which the economy grows thanks to public research. However, this paper is focussed on distributional problems and, therefore, the presence of public research in this model is just a simplifying assumption in order to obtain endogenous technological innovation without the di¢culties that would imply the introduction of a private R&D sector. Pelloni (1997) allows the government to invest in public research so as to improve the growth performance of the economy but does not allow for private research. On the contrary, Park (1998) considers both public and private research. This author introduces public research in the model of expanding variety of products …rst presented in Romer (1990) . He assumes that public research indirectly contributes to economic growth because it causes a positive external e¤ect on the knowledge accumulation of the private sector. However, the paper is mainly concerned with open economies issues and international spillovers rather than with public research policy. This last paper does not distinguish between basic and applied research. Indeed, the di¤erence between basic and applied research is absent from all the papers previously mentioned. Very few authors have tried to address the issue of basic versus applied research, especially in a macroeconomic context. The paper by reviews the literature and establishes the main debates on the issue of public science, focusing on the di¤erences between basic and applied research and the need for public provision of basic knowledge. Similarly, the work of analyzes the e¤ects of the various public research policies on private R&D expenditures, though the analysis is performed by means of a simple, partial equilibrium, static model.
Regarding empirical studies on the in ‡uence of R&D expenditures on productivity growth, Griliches (1986) …nds evidence of the positive e¤ects of both publicly …nanced R&D and basic research while Mans…eld (1995) analyses the interaction between academic research and industrial innovation. The most recent econometric work on the relationship between public and private research is surveyed in David, Hall and Toole (2000) .
However, there still exists a need for a theoretical model able to modelize the e¤ects of research policy on economic growth.
In order to bring the analysis closer to reality, we have considered the main policy responses that actual governments use to prevent private underprovision of research. These policies are usually classi…ed in two groups. The …rst one concerns the direct procurement of research in public facilities, while the second includes policies consisting on giving incentives for a greater amount of private investment. These incentives can take the form of tax reductions intended to reduce the cost of R&D but they can also involve direct funding of speci…c R&D programs. We will modelize these types of policies in the framework of an endogenous growth model.
There exists a growing debate concerning whether public research should take the form of basic or applied research and whether it should be performed at public institutions or in close coordination with private …rms.
We will make explicit the di¤erence between basic and applied research and explore the di¤erent e¤ects that the various policies available could have on the R&D sector and the economy as a whole.
The basic model we propose as framework for this analysis is the one …rst presented in Aghion and Howitt (1998) . In this model, the economy grows thanks to both capital accumulation and technological change. Therefore, this model overcomes one of the main objections traditionally raised against technological change models, namely, that capital accumulation was ignored as a source of growth. Furthermore, the presence of a continuum of research sectors eliminates uncertainty at the aggregate, allowing for the use of non-stochastic steady state analysis at the macroeconomic level. In Aghion and Howitt model, …rms invest in research projects that yield a new product or a new production technology with a certain probability. In the present model, we want to introduce a distinction between basic and applied research. Intuitively, applied research is aimed at obtaining innovations able to improve a particular production technology or that can give raise to a new product or variety. On the contrary, basic research is usually concerned with projects whose outcomes do not normally have a direct market application, though they add to the knowledge base. This does not necessarily mean that private …rms will not perform basic research, since we consider that even though basic research alone would not be able to produce a marketable innovation, it is able to increase the productivity of applied research. This is due to the fact that basic science allows researchers in applied …elds to understand previous knowledge or to adapt innovations from other …elds to their own sector.
We …nd that subsidies to private research increase R&D investment, both in applied and basic …elds, and that this policy is bene…cial for long term growth. However, the e¤ect on steady state consumption is generally negative and, therefore, the …nal e¤ect on welfare results from the trade o¤ between consumption and growth. Due to this fact, the sign of the e¤ect on welfare is ambiguous. For a empirically acceptable set of parameter values, a marginal subsidy to research would have positive e¤ects though excessively high values of the subsidy could harm welfare rather than improve it.
Concerning the other available policy instruments, we will di¤erentiate public production of research from direct funding of R&D projects in the following manner: when research is performed at public institutions, any innovation with a market application that arises from public research will compete with private research in the concession of patents. On the other hand, direct funding of research consists of public aids to private projects which, if successful, will keep the patent in the private sector. Consider thus …rst the case in which the public sector performs exclusively basic research at public institutions. This type of research increases aggregate knowledge and will a¤ect private …rms only through the spillovers created by the faster growing base of knowledge. In other words, the faster accumulation of non-rival and non-excludable knowledge will induce a more important technology improvement when an innovation occurs in the private sector.
The growth e¤ect of a higher public budget for research is unambiguously positive while the welfare e¤ect, calibrated for empirically acceptable values of the parameters, seems to be also positive.
When the public sector is allowed to perform both applied and basic research, it may happen that a public project gains the patent in a given sector. In this sense, the public sector behaves as a direct competitor of private research …rms and therefore, the public investment in research should be taken into account when computing the sector's rate of replacement. This rate is given by the probability that an innovation occurs in a given sector, which in turn is determined by the amount of research invested in that sector. A higher rate of replacement implies a lower value of the innovation because it reduces the expected life of the patent. Therefore, even though public research will add to the accumulation of knowledge, it also causes this "business-stealing" e¤ect that crowds out private research. Consequently, the net result on the growth rate will depend on which e¤ect dominates and on the actual values of private and public research. We …nd that in order to have a positive e¤ect on growth of either type of public R&D, the amounts of public applied and basic research must keep certain proportions. In particular, we …nd that increasing public applied research from zero, the crowding out of private research is so large that the e¤ect on growth will initially be negative for any given value of public basic research. However, if we keep increasing public applied research, the e¤ect on growth will become positive. This is due to the fact that public research is actually substituting private R&D as the source of innovative activity. Indeed, it is relatively easy to crowd out completely private research when the public sector performs both applied and basic research. With regard to the welfare change induced by this policy, again the opposite behavior of consumption and growth forces a calibration in order to obtain a sign. The calibration suggests that welfare may be improved with both types of public research though the introduction of applied public research will initially reduce welfare. Similarly, excessive amounts of public research will determine low levels of steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit which eventually, will impede further welfare improvements.
An alternative policy instrument is direct funding of speci…c research projects. In order to simplify and to di¤erentiate it clearly from the previous policy, we assume that the government provides a given amount of output to be used in a speci…c project, either applied or basic, but that in case of success, the patent remains with the research …rm. The implications of this type of …nancing di¤er from the previous policy in the sense that the amount of research …nanced by the public sector increases the productivity of private research. This is so because in order to obtain a given probability of success, the private investment required is smaller the larger the amount …nanced by the government. We still …nd the "business stealing" e¤ect of the previous policy but it is now softened by the increase of research productivity. Consequently, the e¤ects on growth of both applied and basic research are unambiguously positive. Remarkably, we …nd that in equilibrium, the e¤ects on growth and research intensity of public basic and applied research are identical, which suggests that if the research policy is developed through direct funding of private projects, the relevant amount is the total research investment and not whether it has been devoted to applied or basic projects.
Another relevant di¤erence with respect to public production of research is the impact on the amount of private investment in research. While research performed at public institutions causes a clear crowding out of private R&D investment, the e¤ect of direct funding is ambiguous. Depending on the actual values of the parameters, we can even …nd that public and private research behave as complements at the steady state. The econometric evidence is not clear at this point. While some studies identify public and private research as substitutes, other works …nd that an increase in public research may cause a parallel increase in private R&D investment. 1 The fact that data on R&D expenditures usually include together both public research and public funding of private projects may be one of the causes of the present di¢culties to settle the question. With respect to the welfare e¤ects of this policy, again the trade o¤ between consumption and growth determines a positive impact on welfare for small values of public research investment that may become negative for higher values as consumption per e¢ciency unit diminishes.
In summary, the results suggest that while tax incentives to private research always have a positive growth e¤ect, public research may not be the appropriate policy in some circumstances. We …nd that research performed at public institutions is always bene…cial if it is only concerned with basic research.
However, if public institutions do investigate also in applied …elds, the impact on long run growth may be negative when some conditions are met. The condition for a positive growth e¤ect requires that the relative amounts of applied and basic research lie between some limits, and that one of them is not excessive with respect to the other. For instance, if the amounts of basic and applied research are chosen so as to maximize the probability of success for a given amount of total investment, the e¤ect on growth is always positive, though the crowding out of private research is so important that it would be relatively easy to crowd it out completely. We also …nd that direct funding of research has unambiguously positive growth e¤ects.
The rest of the paper is divided into the following sections: section 2 presents the model, sections 3 and 4 present the steady state and welfare analysis and section 5 concludes the paper.
The model
We consider a growth model with endogenous technological change in which research may be performed by both the private and the public sector. Long run economic growth comes from both technological innovation and capital accumulation. There exist two types of research projects depending on whether they are concerned with basic or applied issues. Successful applied projects produce a new technology that will generate monopoly rents for the owner of the patent. Research projects focused exclusively on basic …elds are not able to generate a new product or variety though they contribute to the accumulation of general knowledge. In combination with applied research, basic research is able to increase R&D productivity because it facilitates the absorption of intersectoral and intertemporal spillovers. As a consequence, private …rms will only engage in projects with an applied component though they may …nd it optimal to devote 1 See .
some additional resources to basic research in order to increase the productivity of their own research.
Consumers
There exists an in…nitely lived representative consumer whose utility function is assumed to be logarithmic for the sake of simplicity. Consequently, the lifetime utility of the consumer will be given by the following expression:
where C t is consumption at time t and ½ is the rate of discount.
Final good sector
The consumption good is produced in a competitive market out of labor and intermediate goods. 
where Y t is …nal good production and A it is the productivity coe¢cient of each sector. The evolution of each sector's productivity coe¢cient A it is determined in the research sector. I assume equal factor intensity to simplify calculations.
Intermediate goods
Intermediate goods are used as factors of production in the …nal good sector. Each sector has a monopolistic structure. In order to become the monopolist producer of an intermediate good, the entrepreneur has to buy the patent of the latest version of the product. This patent gives him the right to produce the good until an innovation occurs and the monopolist is displaced by the owner of the new technology. where m it is production of intermediate good i at date t: Thus, the monopolist's pro…t maximization problem is the following:
from where we obtain the pro…t-maximizing supply and the ‡ow of pro…ts as
Due to the assumption of equal factor intensity, supply of intermediate goods is equal in all sectors, m it = m t . Thus, the aggregate demand of capital is equal to
be the aggregate productivity coe¢cient. Then, equilibrium in the capital market requires demand to equal supply
or equivalently, the ‡ow of intermediate output must be equal to capital intensity, k t
With this notation we can express the equilibrium rental rate in terms of capital intensity
Research sector
For each of the above intermediate sectors, there is a number of research …rms competing in a patent race to get the next innovation. Innovations are produced using the same technology of the …nal good. Hence, it needs physical capital (embodied in the intermediate goods) apart from labor to be produced. Technology is assumed to be increasingly complex and hence further innovations will require higher investments. Accordingly, the amount invested in research in each sector N it will be adjusted by a coe¢cient representing the aggregate state of knowledge. This coe¢cient will be given by A max t
; the productivity parameter of the leading edge technology. Hence, we may de…ne n it = Nit A max t as the productivity adjusted level of research:
The arrival rate of innovations at each sector is given by the following expression:
where¸is a positive parameter representing the productivity of research, n a and n b are the levels of research intensity devoted to applied and basic issues respectively, and b is a positive parameter that measures the in ‡uence of basic research on the total private research productivity. 2 This functional form tries to capture the idea that basic research is not essential in order to obtain an innovation with market applications as opposed to applied research, which is assumed to be essential. Given the total amount n it of research, the …rm will choose n a and n b in order to maximize the probability of obtaining an innovation. The optimal shares are thus,
In order to simplify the analysis, we will consider only those situations in which private …rms invest in basic research, that is, n it > 1 b : 3 The results when this assumption is not satis…ed are presented in Appendix D.
In equilibrium, the arrival rate of innovations in sector i will be given by the following expressioņ
which may be obtained substituting (5) and (6) in (4) .
The payo¤ to innovators if they succeed is the ‡ow of pro…ts obtained from the monopolistic exploitation of the new technology. The value of this payo¤ is identical for any researcher innovating at t and therefore, research intensity will be the same across sectors. Consequently, we drop the i subindex from research intensity.
When an innovation occurs in a given sector, the productivity parameter of that sector jumps discontinuously to A max t ; the leading edge productivity coe¢cient. Thus, advances in other sectors spillover to the rest of the economy making the technology improvement induced by the next innovation more important. The evolution of A max t is determined by the evolution of the aggregate state of knowledge: While for a particular …rm we assumed that basic research was not essential in order to obtain an innovation, in the case of the aggregate state of knowledge, we are going to assume that both basic and applied research are essential factors. This assumption re ‡ects the extended belief that in the long run, the knowledge base cannot go on growing if basic knowledge is not further developed. 4 Consequently, we assume that the rate of growth of
is given by the following expression:
where n A and n B are total applied and basic research intensity, that is, including both public and private research. Under these assumptions, the distribution of productivity parameters across sectors will change as A max t grows. However, if we de…ne the relative productivity parameter of a sector as a it = Ait A max t ; one can prove that the distribution of a it converges to a stationary distribution. In addition, the stationarity of the distribution of a implies that the aggregate and the leading edge productivities are proportional. . 5 For the distribution of relative productivities across sectors see Appendix A.
Let h (a) be the density function of a: Then, by de…nition,
In order to determine private research intensity, consider the value of obtaining an innovation at time t: When the innovation occurs, a new technology with a productivity parameter A max t is available for the owner of the patent. The new producer will force the previous incumbent out of the market and will start producing as a monopolist. Therefore, the ‡ow of pro…ts will be given by the following expression:
The new producer will be able to keep its monopolistic position until a new innovation occurs in that sector.
Therefore, the present value of the innovation at time t is given by
where¸p (n it ) is the ‡ow probability that an innovation occurs in that sector.
The cost of one unit of research in terms of output is 1. Therefore, since n t = is the subsidy to innovative activity. The marginal bene…t of one unit of research intensity is the product of the value of the innovation V t and the private marginal e¤ect of research on that sector's rate of innovatioņ
nt : Thus, the research …rm sees itself as facing a constant arrival rate¸p
nt n jt per unit of research expenditure where n t is the sector's R&D expenditure and n jt is the …rm's research intensity. Hence, the research arbitrage condition is
Notice that this arbitrage condition establishes a relationship between the equilibrium values of capital and research intensity.
Capital market
Capital is used as a factor of production in the intermediate goods sector. We have seen that equilibrium in the capital market requires the rental rate to satisfy equation (3) . The owner of a unit of capital will obtain ³ t for it. This amount must be enough to cover the cost of capital. This includes the rate of interest (r t ), the depreciation rate (±), and the tax rate on capital accumulation (¿ k ). Hence, the capital market arbitrage equation is
which establishes a decreasing relationship between the interest rate and capital intensity.
Research policy
There exist three major types of public intervention in the research sector. The …rst one, already introduced in the model, consists of tax incentives to reduce the private cost of research production. In addition, the government may directly modify the total amount of output invested in research. We will assume that it can do so in two di¤erent ways. It can produce research at public institutions without any kind of collaboration with private …rms and in direct competition with them. This policy is dubbed public provision of research.
On the other hand, the government may fund private projects, acting in close collaboration with private …rms. To simplify, the government is assumed to act altruistically in this case, which implies that the patent remains with the private …rm. To di¤erentiate it from the previous policy, we will refer to this one as public
funding. Let us now analyze the implications for the basic model of these two types of policies.
Public provision of research.
Assume the government can perform research in the same conditions as private …rms and de…ne¡ a and¡ b as the amounts of output invested in applied and basic research by public institutions. 6 Thus, public applied and basic research intensity will be given by
Therefore, the probability that the public sector gets an innovation will be given by¸
The additional research implies that the total probability of an innovation occurring in a given sector will now be¸[n a (1
Consequently, the research arbitrage equation will be given by
Notice that public research in this case induces a higher rate of creative destruction, i.e. a higher probability that the owner of the patent is replaced. Therefore, the research activity of the public sector reduces the present value of an innovation for a private researcher. In the case that the public sector gets the patent, it will be sold to an intermediate good producer and the value of the patent will be transferred to consumers in the form of a lump sum transfer.
Public funding of research.
This type of research policy directly a¤ects the microeconomic decision of the research …rm about the amounts to be invested in basic and applied research. Consequently, we must rewrite the problem of the …rm as follows:
subject to the following constraints:
n b¸0 : 6 We assume that the amount invested in each sector is the same so that aggregate and sectoral amounts coincide.
The optimal choices for n a and n b are
We will consider only situations with n b positive in the main text. The results when private …rms do not perform basic research may be found in Appendix D. For n a and n b positive, the probability of obtaining an innovation given n it is¸p
where ¡ = ¡ a + ¡ b : Again, the symmetric behavior of the sectors in equilibrium allows us to drop the i subindex of n it in (11) . The probability of the project being successful per unit of research intensity is thuş
Therefore, the research arbitrage equation is given by
The main di¤erence with the previous policy in terms of the implications for the research arbitrage equation, is that even though the e¤ect on the rate of creative destruction still remains, there is an additional e¤ect on the productivity of research. This e¤ect is represented by the fact that in the presence of public funding, the probability of obtaining an innovation per unit of private research intensity is now given by¸(
Equilibrium
General equilibrium is de…ned by the two equations determining equilibrium in the capital and research sectors. These equations are
for the capital market and
for the research market in the case of public provision or,
for the case of public funding.
The systems formed by equations (12) and (13), and (12) and (14) de…ne the equilibrium values for k t and n t in each case. These systems implicitly determine a relationship between capital and research intensity that allows us to analyze the dynamics of the model in terms of capital and consumption. The laws of motion for capital and consumption are given by
and
where (15) is derived from the consumer's optimization problem. These expressions can be written in e¢ciency units as follows:
where°t is the growth rate of A max t and therefore is given by
hich, ultimately is a continuous function of n t . Let n d (k t ) be the dynamic relationship between capital and research intensity de…ned by equations (12) and (13) or (12) and (14). 7 Then, we can express equations (16) and (17) in terms of k t and c t exclusively
Due to the non-linearity of the system we proceed with its linearization around the steady state in order to analyze the dynamics of the model. It can be proved that the system exhibits local saddle path stability around the steady state. Therefore, we can perform comparative statics analysis at the long run equilibrium.
Steady state
In equilibrium the production function is simpli…ed due to the fact that the equilibrium value of intermediate input is the same for every sector. Consequently, we may write equation (2) as
7 Speci…cally, n d (kt) is obtained as follows: equation (12) de…nes the interest rate as a function of kt: Therefore, we can substitute in either (13) or (14) so as to obtain nt as an implicit function of capital intensity. Depending on whether we are considering public provision or direct funding, n d (kt) is de…ned by equation (13) or (14) . Consequently, we should use a di¤erent notation for each function. However, for the sake of simplicity and because the implications for the dynamics of the model are equivalent, we denote the two functions by n d (k t ):
which implies that in a steady state, the rate of growth of output will be the rate of growth of aggregate productivity. That is°=
Using this result, and the fact that in a steady state k and n are constant we may write equations (12), (13) and (14) as follows:°+
Equations (21) and (22) on one hand and (21) and (23) on the other determine the steady state values of k and n for the two alternative assumptions. Let us consider the two research policies separately.
Public provision
If research is performed at public institutions, in direct competition with private …rms, the equations determining k and n are (21) and (22) . The growth e¤ect of giving tax incentives to private research …rms is established in the following proposition:
The long run growth rate increases when the subsidy rate to private research is raised.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The cost reduction induced by the subsidy increases the optimal choice of private research intensity. The higher investment in research implies a larger productivity growth and hence, the economy will grow faster.
Concerning the e¤ect of public provision of research, notice that if no public applied research is performed, the amount of basic research produced at public institutions does not a¤ect the rate of creative destruction.
However, this research adds to the stock of knowledge and will make private research more productive via spillovers, both of the intertemporal and intersectoral varieties. Therefore, the e¤ect on growth of increasing public investment in basic research should be positive. However, a higher value of ¡ b will reduce private research intensity. This crowding out of private research is due to the increase in factor prices induced by the higher public investment. Nevertheless, the reduction in private research is not large enough to compensate for the positive e¤ect of the public investment and the …nal net result on the growth rate is positive. On the contrary, if public applied research is positive then basic research has an additional e¤ect. Namely, that it will increase the probability that the public sector gains a patent. This will induce a larger crowding out of private research and reduce the expected life of any future innovation, because the rate of replacement will be higher. Whether the …nal impact on growth will be positive or negative depends upon the levels of public basic and applied research and on the parameter values. Due to the ambiguity in the sign of the growth e¤ect we proceed to de…ne parameter subspaces for which the growth derivative shows the desired sign. Let us de…ne the following vectors of parameters: µ´(®; ±; ½;¸; s n ; ¿ k ; ¾; L) 2 £ where
Denote the parameter space by ´£ £ ª and de…ne the following subspaces of ª and :
where ²; Â 1; Â 2 ; Â 3 and Â 4 are de…ned in Appendix B.1. The following propositions establish the e¤ect of public basic and applied research on growth:
Proposition 2 If either ¡ a = 0 or Ã 2 ª 1 then, the e¤ect on growth of public basic research is positive.
Conversely, if ! 2 1 ; the growth e¤ect of ¡ b is negative.
Proposition 2 implies that the e¤ect on growth of public basic research is ambiguous when there exists a positive level of public applied research. Intuitively, a larger public investment in basic research will make the economy grow faster when the existing level of public applied research is not too large and ¡ b keeps in a certain range relative to ¡ a : On the contrary, in order to …nd a negative e¤ect on growth, the amount of public applied research must be very large relative to the amount of public basic research. In any case, when both ¡ a and ¡ b are very large, the e¤ect on growth will generally be positive, due to the fact that for high levels of public research intensity, the level of private research will be so low that the relevant variables for the growth rate of the economy will be the amounts of public investment.
Proposition 3 If Ã 2 ª 2 then the e¤ect on growth of public applied research is positive. On the contrary,
If the public sector decides to increase public applied research from zero, the most relevant e¤ect will be a large crowding out of private research. As a consequence, the rate of growth of the economy will generally fall when the levels of public applied research are close to zero. However, if public investment in applied research keeps growing the e¤ect on growth may be inverted. This is so because the crowding out of private research is smaller as ¡ a grows. The conditions in Proposition 3 require large values of both basic and applied public research in order to have a positive e¤ect on growth of ¡ a and small values of public applied research or large di¤erences between basic and applied investments in order to have a negative e¤ect on growth.
In summary, what the previous propositions require is that the amounts invested in applied and basic research keep certain proportions. If the investment in one of the two types of research is too large or too small relative to the other then the e¤ect on growth will be negative. Accordingly, it appears interesting to analyze the implications of public R&D when it is divided into basic and applied research following a certain rule. Given that this type of public intervention depicts the public sector behaving as a private research …rm, we want to consider also the e¤ect of public research if the amounts of public basic and applied research are chosen so as to get the maximum probability of obtaining an innovation for a given amount of public investment in research. In other words, let
and Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The result established in the previous proposition implies that the public sector can actually substitute the private research sector and, since we have assumed the same productivity for the private and the public sector, this would be bene…cial for the growth performance of the economy. However, this result is due to the assumption that the amount of research invested by the public sector is not limited by pro…tability conditions, since it may be …nanced by lump sum taxes. If we assumed instead that the public sector must look for …nance in the creditl market, then it would be constrained by the same research arbitrage equation as private …rms, and there would exist a maximum level of research at which its marginal cost equals the marginal bene…t.
Public funding
If research policy consists on the provision of funds for private …rms' research projects, the relevant equations in order to determine the steady state values of n and k are (21) and (23) . In this case, the following propositions apply:
Proposition 5 A higher subsidy rate to private research increases the steady state growth rate of the economy.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Proposition 5 shows that the e¤ect of a subsidy to private research is not a¤ected by the assumption on whether public research is performed at public institutions or in coordination with private …rms. Thus, the concession of tax incentives to private research continues having a positive e¤ect on long run growth, since it increases the amount of private research intensity. Notice also that an increase in n reduces the ratio of total applied research to total basic research. This may suggest that the privately chosen amounts of applied and basic research are biased towards applied research, while the economy could bene…t from a reduction of this ratio. With respect to the e¤ects of the amounts devoted to public research, we …nd that they are quite di¤erent to public provision, as the next proposition establishes:
Proposition 6 A higher research intensity in either applied or basic …elds implies a larger rate of growth in the long run. In equilibrium, the e¤ects of marginal changes of applied and basic research on the growth rate are identical.
The positive e¤ect on private research productivity of this type of research policy outweighs the negative e¤ect of the higher probability of replacement induced by public research, which makes the crowding out of private R&D smaller or even, in some cases cause the opposite e¤ect. That is, we can …nd situations in which an increase of public research implies a higher amount of private R&D investment. The e¤ect on private research is thus ambiguous, as opposed to the previous case, in which private R&D always decreases after an increase in public research. Concerning the result that the e¤ects of public applied and basic research are identical in terms of growth, it is due to the fact that private …rms internalize the funds provided by the public sector in such a way that if for instance, the amount of public basic research is increased, the …rm will reduce its own investment in basic research and devote more resources to applied research. The same applies for public applied research. Therefore, the behavior of the …rm neutralizes the possibility of having di¤erent e¤ects on growth of these two types of public R&D. In addition, we …nd that an increase in either applied or basic public research is going to reduce the ratio of total applied research to total basic research and from Proposition 6 we know that this is going to have a positive e¤ect on growth. Thus, we …nd again, as in the case of research subsidies, that a reduction of nA nB ; with n A and n B increasing, is bene…cial for the rate of growth of the economy.
One of the main di¤erences between public funding of research and direct R&D subsidies is that with public funding the government may choose the amounts devoted to basic and applied …elds. The result established in Proposition 6 indicates that this di¤erence will not be relevant for the growth performance of the economy. However, this does not imply that both policies are equivalent. If we want to compare the growth e¤ects of research subsidies and public research, we can take as reference the no intervention equilibrium and compare the growth and private research derivatives with respect to the policy instruments.
The following propositions compare the e¤ects of the introduction of these policies: 
Proofs. See Appendix B.2.
The previous results compare the e¤ects of the two policies at s n = 0 and ¡ = 0 because at this point they can be made equivalent in terms of the public budget. Two policies are equivalent in terms of the public budget if they imply the same …scal e¤ort. 8 Thus, if the government's budget is given by
any two policies that we wish to compare must imply the same marginal change in the lump sum tax T t used to balance the budget. We …nd that the growth e¤ects are identical, however the e¤ects on private research di¤er, since the subsidy will always induce a larger increase in this variable. Intuitively, the research subsidy provokes a larger investment from the private sector, while the increase in public funding provides an extra investment that allows the private sector to reduce their investment e¤ort. Therefore, even though their e¤ect on growth is equivalent, they have di¤erent e¤ects on research intensity and probably on consumption and welfare. The choice of policy will thus depend on how the authorities want to in ‡uence private research investment.
In summary, we …nd that both tax incentives and public funding of private research have unambiguously positive e¤ects on long run growth and therefore, are research policies that can be undertaken without fear of damaging the growth performance of the economy. However, public provision of research is a more dangerous tool, since under some conditions, public research can be harmful for the private R&D sector and the economy as a whole. Nevertheless, if public provision of research were exclusively con…ned to basic …elds, or if basic and applied research are kept in the right proportions, the negative e¤ects of this type of policy would be avoided.
Concerning the debate on whether public research should be more market oriented or be devoted only to the accumulation of basic knowledge, the model predicts di¤erent results depending on which speci…c policy is carried over. If we are considering public funding of private research and we take funds from basic research to use them in applied …elds, the e¤ect on long run growth will be null due to the accommodating behavior of private research …rms. However, in the case of public provision, a redirection of funds from basic to applied …elds will have positive or negative e¤ects depending on the initial situation of the economy.
Welfare analysis
From equation (1) we can express utility at the steady state in terms of the stationary level of consumption and the long-run growth rate
The change in steady state welfare is a combination of the change in steady state consumption and the change in steady state growth
where x represents any of the three policy instruments, s n ; ¡ a and ¡ b :
This measure of welfare is valid to compare two situations of long run equilibrium. However, it does not consider the periods of transition during which the economy moves from one equilibrium to another. In order to re ‡ect the transition we must analyze the e¤ect on lifetime utility. Rewrite equation (1) to obtain the following expression for lifetime utility:
where°t(x) and c t (x) are the time paths of the growth rate and the level of consumption per e¢ciency unit after a change in one of the policy parameters. The e¤ect on utility will thus be given by the e¤ects on the paths of growth and consumption. I will obtain …rst the e¤ect on the paths of consumption and capital intensity and then use the latter to get the e¤ect on the path of the growth rate.
Let c = p(k; x) be the saddle path of the system which can be interpreted as the graph of a policy function relating consumption and capital. Then we know that its slope, p k its positive and equal to
9 Substituting the policy function into the law of motion of capital; which we denote by '(k; c); the equilibrium dynamics of the system can be characterized by a single di¤erential equation which describes the evolution of the state variable along the stable manifold.
The solution to this equation, k t (x), gives the equilibrium value of k as a function of time and the policy parameter: Using k t (x) in the policy function we would obtain the time path of c c t (x) = p(k t (x); x):
To calculate the change in welfare we need the derivative of the whole time path of c with respect to x
where p x is the derivative of the policy function with respect to the policy instrument or graphically, the shift in the saddle path caused by the policy change.
In order to compute dkt(x) dx ; notice that k t (x) = k(t; x) must satisfy identically the original equation
where ' (c; k; x) is the law of motion of capital given by equation (18) . Di¤erentiate both sides with respect
Hence k x satis…es a linear di¤erential equation. Moreover, when we start from a steady state, the coe¢cients of this equation are constant and we can write
The general solution is given by
Since k is a predetermined variable, the change at the date of the policy change k x (0) must be zero. The long run e¤ect, k x (1) = lim t!1 k x (t); is in fact the derivative of the steady state value of k with respect to the policy parameter, and can be expressed as
The equilibrium time path of the derivative of k with respect to x is thus given by
that is, k will gradually reach its new steady state value at a rate equal to the negative eigenvalue.
Substitute now in equation (25) to obtain the …nal expression for the derivative of the time path of consumption with respect to the policy parameter
As before, we can identify the immediate change and the long run e¤ect
where the …rst represents the necessary jump of consumption to get on the new saddle path and the second is the e¤ect on the steady state value of consumption. Thus, consumption will initially jump to the new saddle path and then it will approach its new steady state value at a rate equal to¸1:
The derivative of the growth rate and consumption per e¢ciency unit at date t are given by
Hence, the change in welfare will be given by the following expression:
Equations (24) and (26) give the general expressions for the e¤ect of the three policies on the di¤erent measures of welfare. Given that the expression in square brackets is negative, the relationship between the two measures of welfare will be determined by the sign of @k @x in each case. Consider the change in welfare excluding the periods of transition, that is, equation (24) . If steady state consumption and growth evolve in opposite directions, the actual value of the discount rate ½ will be determinant for the sign of the welfare change and we will not be able to give an unambiguous sign to the change in welfare without assuming a speci…c value for the discount rate. Unfortunately, this will normally be the case. Just for illustrative purposes, a calibration was made for empirically acceptable values of the parameters:
11 Table 1 suggests that the research subsidy may have positive e¤ects on welfare though only for low values of the policy instrument. However, if we introduce a slight change in the parameters, the range of values for which an increase of s n is welfare improving is substantially enlarged. In summary thus, the calibration is suggesting that the research subsidy may increase welfare, though for high values of s n the change in welfare becomes negative. Figure 1 illustrates the e¤ect on the two measures of welfare taking as reference the level of welfare attained at s n = 0:
Regarding the e¤ects on consumption of public research, we cannot give an unambiguous sign to the relevant derivatives, which implies that very little can be said about the e¤ect on welfare of policies a¤ecting the level of public research. Nevertheless, the simulation results presented in tables 1 to 7 suggest that the e¤ect on welfare of marginally increasing public R&D may be positive. In particular, Tables 2 and 3 present the e¤ect on consumption and welfare of marginal changes in public basic research. If public applied research is zero, a marginal increase in basic R&D is negative for steady state consumption. However, the e¤ect on the measure of welfare that includes the periods of transition is initially positive. In addition, we found that this result is quite robust to changes in parameters other than the discount rate. Figure 2 shows the relationship between welfare and public basic research. Observe that as the amount of basic research increases its e¤ect on the growth rate diminishes while consumption per e¢ciency unit decreases due to the taxes necessary to …nance this policy. As a consequence, the e¤ect on welfare becomes negative for high values of public R&D investment. Table 3 shows the results when public applied research is positive. Notice 10 The derivatives of°d are evaluated at the steady state because we consider the stationary equilibrium as the situation before the tax change. 11 Refer to Appendix C for the calibration results.
that the introduction of basic research reduces the growth rate, implying an initial reduction of the measure of welfare that includes the periods of transition. Further increases in ¡ b will make the economy grow faster as we move into the set of policy parameter combinations that increases°. Nevertheless, the two measures of welfare fall for these higher values of public basic research as shown in Figure 3 . Similarly, Table 4 The results under the public funding assumption, presented in tables 6 and 7, and Figures 6 and 7 indicate that the e¤ect on welfare of research subsidies and public R&D may be positive but only for low values of the policy parameters.
Conclusions
This paper has addressed the issue of the need for an active research policy and has discussed the implications of the di¤erent alternatives that actual governments have at their disposal. The analysis has been performed in the context of an endogenous growth model with technological change in which private …rms may invest both in applied and basic research. The di¤erence between these two types of research is relevant due to the existing debate on whether public research should limit itself to basic knowledge or, on the contrary, should be directed to projects with market applications. In addition, it has been found that subsidies to private research will make the economy grow faster and may increase consumer welfare since this policy increases private research investment.
Public research performed at public institutions has di¤erent implications depending on whether this research is directed towards basic or applied …elds. When public research is exclusively concerned with basic knowledge, the e¤ect on growth and welfare of this type of public investment is positive. This is due to the fact that innovations arising from public basic research will add to the stock of knowledge and spillover to the rest of the economy. These spillovers translate into more important technological improvements when private R&D is successful, which determines a higher growth rate of aggregate technology and hence, of the economy. However, if public institutions do research also in applied …elds, any innovation arising from this type of research will be patentable. This implies that public institutions will compete with private …rms in the patent race and thus, public research will have to be included when considering the rate of replacement of a sector. This rate is given by the probability that an innovation occurs in a given sector and determines the expected life of an existing patent. The e¤ect of public applied research on the rate of replacement represents a negative externality for private research …rms, since the expected value of an innovation falls when the rate of replacement increases. However, public applied research also adds to the stock of knowledge and in consequence, causes a positive external e¤ect. The interaction of these opposing forces determines an ambiguous e¤ect of public applied research on growth.
On the other hand, we have found that public funding of private projects has an unambiguously positive growth e¤ect. This is mainly due to the higher productivity of private research induced by this policy and to the fact that it does not necessarily crowd out private research. Indeed, whether public funding of research projects induces more private investment or not depends upon the initial situation of the economy and on the actual values of the parameters though, for a set of plausible parameter values, it is easy to obtain the result that private and public research behave as complements rather than substitutes. We observe that in equilibrium, the funding of either applied or basic projects have identical e¤ects on private research and growth. Therefore, if research policy is instrumented through the funding of private projects, it is irrelevant whether the funds are used for basic or applied projects. This is turn implies that moving funds from basic projects to more applied …elds, as proposed by the "new economic instrumentalism", 12 would have a null e¤ect on long run growth. Additionally, we have compared the e¤ects on growth of subsidizing research as opposed to public funding of projects. We have found that the e¤ect on growth of both policies is equal when evaluated at the no intervention equilibrium.
[25] Stenbacka, R. and M. Tomback (1998) "Technology policy and the organization of R&D" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 36, 503-520.
A Distribution of relative productivities across sectors
Let F (¢; t) be the cumulative distribution function of absolute productivity coe¢cients A it at any given date
gives us the mass of sectors with a productivity coe¢cient below
at date t: Therefore,
where d (t) is the probability that a sector innovates. Thus, depending on the assumption that we are considering, it will be given by¸p (n t ) +¸¡ a (1 + b¡ b ) in the case of public provision or¸p (n t ; ¡) in the case of public funding. Equation (27) holds because at t 0 no sector can have a productivity parameter above
and equation (28) gives us the rate at which the sectors behind A max t0
innovate and get a productivity parameter larger than A max t 0 : These two equations de…ne a di¤erential equation whose solution is given by
We also know that
Equation (30) de…nes an implicit function relating t with a 0 ; the relative productivity parameter of a sector that innovated on date t 0 : Let t =t (a 0 ) be this function, and use it to perform a change of variable in (29) so that we will now have
Notice that this function is giving us the mass of sectors with a productivity parameter smaller or equal than A max t0
and that this is equivalent to the mass of sectors with a relative productivity parameter a it below a 0 : Therefore, we can rede…ne © ¡t (a 0 ) ¢ = H (a 0 ) as the value of the distribution function for a sector that innovated on date t 0 : After a long enough period of time, all sectors will have innovated at least once and therefore, H (a) will be the distribution function of any sector with a 2 (0; 1) : Therefore, the long run distribution of relative productivity parameters across sectors will be given by
where we are usingt ¡1 (t) = a andt ¡1 (t 0 ) = 1: Notice that this distribution is time invariant.
In general, we will not be able to obtain the functional form of H (a) for any economic equilibrium.
Nevertheless, in order to study the dynamics of the economy it is enough to know that the distribution is time invariant. However, we can get the expression of H (a) when the economy is in a steady state, since in that case both the growth rate of the economy°; and the probability of innovation d; are constant and thus (30) becomes
from where we can obtain the expression fort (a) as given by
which allows us to obtain the distribution function as
B Proofs of propositions
B.1 Propositions under the public provision assumption
Proof of Proposition 1. The e¤ect on growth of s n is given by the following expression:
Therefore, in order to …nd the sign of d°d sn we need …rst the sign of dn dsn : This derivative can be obtained from the system determining steady state equilibrium using implicit di¤erentiation techniques. Consider the case of public provision of research. The relevant system of equations is the one formed by (21) and (22) .
Rewrite these equations in the following form:
so that we may de…ne the function F : (0; 1) £ (0; 1) ! R 2 whose components are f 1 (¢; ¢) and f 2 (¢; ¢) and use the implicit function theorem to …nd the derivatives needed. The Jacobian of F will be given by
;
The Jacobian may be inverted to obtain
where
is negative. The derivatives of F with respect to s n are given by
Therefore, dn dsn will be given by
which is positive. Therefore, the derivative of the steady state rate of growth with respect to s n is also positive.
Proof of Proposition 2. The e¤ect on growth of public basic research is given by
Accordingly, let us …nd
. The Jacobian of F is not modi…ed but we have to compute the derivatives of F with respect to ¡ b : They are given by the following expressions:
which implies that the derivative of private research with respect to public basic research, as expressed by
is negative. The derivative of°with respect to ¡ b is therefore,
If public applied research is zero,
is positive. However, if ¡ a is positive, the e¤ect on growth of public basic research will be positive whenever
A su¢cient condition for
but this expression still depends upon n: Recall that
For given values of public basic and applied research, nB nA is a function of n whose derivative is given by
is an increasing function of n when 1 + b (¡ a ¡ ¡ b ) > 0 and a decreasing function when
Consider nB nA increasing. Then it will take its maximum value when n goes to in…nity. Since lim n!1 nB nA = 1; a su¢cient condition for (35) to be satis…ed is
Consider now the case when n B n A is decreasing in n; that is when 1 + b (¡ a ¡ ¡ b ) < 0: In this case, n B n A will take its maximum value at n = 1 b (for the range of values that we are considering) and condition (35) will be satis…ed if
It follows that if Ã 2 ª 1 ; condition (34) is satis…ed and d°d ¡b > 0.
In order to prove the third part of the proposition, we have to …nd a su¢cient condition for
Notice that in equilibrium f 1 (k; n) = 0 and thereforȩ
which recalling (34) allows us to state that d°d ¡ b will be negative whenever " 1 2
Notice that the numerator of the last expression of (36) is the discount rate of the ‡ow of pro…ts, which for reasonable values of the parameters should be smaller than 1. In order to impose this condition, de…ne n 1 as the level of research intensity implying a discount rate of 1. Then, a su¢cient condition for the discount rate to be smaller than 1 is n < n 1 or, equivalently,
After having imposed this upper bound for n, a su¢cient condition for (36) to hold is " 1 2
This expression implies that if ¡ a is large relative to ¡ b ; the e¤ect on growth of public basic research will be negative as long as the level of private research intensity is not so small that 1 p(n)bn becomes excessively large. Therefore, what we are requiring is that ¡ a is large relative to ¡ b but also that they both are not too large. If we want to …nd a su¢cient condition that depends only on the values of the parameters we have to impose a lower bound for n: Let n 0 be the level of research intensity that satis…es
where ² is a real number.
14 Then, if n > n 0 ; condition (36) will be satis…ed when " 1 2
In addition, we have to impose the following restriction on the parameters in order to guarantee n > n 0 :
Proof of Proposition 3. The derivative of the growth rate with respect to public applied research is given by
14 The choice of ² must take into account that if it is either too large or too small the set of parameter values satisfying the condition may be empty. For a standard set of parameter values ² = 1; for instance, yields a non-empty set.
As in the previous propositions we compute …rst the derivative of private research intensity with respect to public applied research. In order to do so we need the derivatives of the component functions of F , i.e.
Next, pre-multiply
Notice that this expression is also negative. Now we can write d°d ¡a as follows:
Therefore, public applied research will have a positive e¤ect on growth only if
is positive.
A su¢cient condition for the expression in (41) to be positive is
Given that nA nB as a function of n is increasing when 1+b (¡ a ¡ ¡ b ) < 0 and decreasing when 1+b (¡ a ¡ ¡ b ) > 0, it will take its maximum value when n goes to in…nity in the …rst case and when n = 1 b in the second case. Therefore, su¢cient conditions for (42) to be satis…ed are
Under these conditions, d°d ¡ a > 0: Thus, if Ã 2 ª 2 ; the growth e¤ect of public applied research will be positive:
The expression of d°d ¡a in equation (40) implies that this derivative will be negative whenever
Therefore, following the same reasoning as in the previous proofs, the e¤ect on growth of public applied research will be negative when ! 2 2 .
Proof of Proposition 4. The derivatives of f 1 (k; n) and f 2 (k; n) with respect to ¡ are given by the following expressions:
where we are using the fact that under these assumptions, the derivative of the growth rate with respect to ¡ keeping n constant is equal to the derivative of the growth rate with respect to n: Given (44) and (45), the derivative of private research with respect to public research is
which is negative. Given dn d¡ ; we can express the growth derivative as
B.2 Propositions under the public funding assumption
Proof of Proposition 5. The relevant equations under this assumption are (21) and (23) so that the component functions of F are now
Hence, the Jacobian and its inverse are given by the following matrices:
is also negative.
The derivatives of the component functions of F with respect to s n are
Thus, dn ds n is given by
Therefore, private research intensity increases with subsidies to research and so does the growth rate of the economy.
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that ¡ = ¡ a + ¡ b : Given that both applied and basic public research enter the component functions in equivalent positions, the derivatives of private research intensity with respect to ¡ a and ¡ b will be identical. In addition, the equilibrium expression for the growth rate under this assumption is given by°=
Consequently,
Therefore, we can talk about ¡ exclusively.
In order to obtain dn d¡ we compute the derivatives of the component functions of F as follows:
Therefore, the derivative of private research with respect to public research is given by
Notice that the sign of this derivative is ambiguous, which implies that whether public research crowds out private research or not, depends on the values of the parameters and the initial situation of the economy.
Given dn d¡ ; it is immediate from (46) that the derivative of the growth rate with respect to public funding of research is positive and equal to
Proof of Proposition 7.
In order to compare the growth e¤ects of s n and ¡; they must have an equivalent impact on the public budget. So let us consider as the initial situation the equilibrium corresponding to s n = 0 and ¡ = 0: In this situation, we must compare
Notice also that from
Since we are considering s n = 0, d°d sn
Proof of Corollary 8. Recall that
C Calibration C.1 Public provision of research Tables 1 to 7 show the results of the calibration of the model for the following set of parameters:
² Capital intensity, ® = 0:7: Therefore, we are considering a broad concept of capital that could include human capital. ² The following tables and …gures present the welfare e¤ects of the di¤erent policy instruments. By default, the policy instruments that are not being analyzed are set to zero, except when indicated. 
C.2 Public funding of research
The calibration is made with the same set of parameters as before but using the corresponding equations for this assumption. 
D Results when private …rms do not invest in basic research
In order to guarantee that the equilibrium value of basic research intensity n b is positive we have to impose some restrictions on the parameters. For the general case without any type of public research, the equations determining n and k in a steady state would be (7) and (8) but substituting the interest rate by its steady state expression r = ½ +°:
Solve for k in (7) and (8) and note that the …rst one is increasing in n while the second is decreasing.
Therefore, the following condition implies n > 1 b :
and where°¡ 
:
Notice that the introduction of the public research will modify the condition for positive private basic research given in equation (47). If we consider public provision of research, the condition is
Similarly, if we consider public funding of research projects, the condition for n b positive is obtained from equations (21) and (23) where 
D.1 Public provision of research
If the equilibrium level of private research is not large enough (i.e. n · 1 b ), …rms do not invest in basic research and therefore, n a = n and n b = 0: Consequently, the arrival rate of innovations in the private sector will be given by¸n The equations determining the steady state value of n and k are given by°+ Following the same steps as in the proofs of propositions 1, 2 and 3 we can compute the derivatives of private research and growth with respect to the policy variables. We …nd that these derivatives are given by 
Since det(J F ) is negative, the derivatives of private research with respect to the subsidy rate and basic and applied public research are respectively positive, negative and negative. This implies that the derivative of the growth rate with respect to the research subsidy is positive. The relationship between steady state growth and public research is ambiguous. We …nd that d°d ¡a will be positive whenever
since under this condition¸( 
Of course, a necessary condition is
Requiring (50) 
Let ¹ n be the equilibrium value of research intensity when ¡ a = 0: Then if the right hand side of (51) is positive when evaluated at 0, there will exist a range of values of ¡ a for which the condition is satis…ed.
However, the left hand side of (51) grows with ¡ a and the right hand side decreases (because n is negatively related to ¡ a and the function is increasing in n): This implies that we will reach a value of ¡ a smaller than for which the condition is no longer satis…ed.
With respect to the growth derivative of public basic research, notice that if ¡ a = 0; it will be positive for any positive value of public basic research. If ¡ a is positive, then a su¢cient condition for
> 0 is the following:
In order to obtain d°d ¡ b < 0 the next inequality must be satis…ed:
(1 ¡ s n ) 2kn 
Of course, for (53) to be satis…ed it is necessary that (52) is not. The right hand side of (53) is decreasing in n if ¡ a > n. Therefore, if we impose ¡ a > 1 b and recall that we are just considering equilibria with n < 1 b ; we can consider this expression decreasing in n: Therefore, a su¢cient condition for wheren is the equilibrium value of research intensity when ¡ b = 0:
Therefore, if initially private …rms do not perform basic research, the appropriate policy to induce them to do so consists of research subsidies that will increase the level of private research since the e¤ect of public R&D, though positive on growth under some conditions, reduces the total amount of private research and thus, will not induce a positive level of private basic research.
D.2 Public funding
When private research does not reach a high enough level, private …rms may not devote resources to basic research. In the case of the public funding assumption this decision depends also on the level of public research. If n < 1 b + ¡ b ¡ ¡ a ; then all the research resources of private …rms are devoted to applied projects of research. In this case, the arrival rate of innovations will bȩ ((n + ¡ a )(1 + b¡ b )) 
where p (n) = ((n + ¡ a )(1 + b¡ b )) Therefore, the three derivatives are positive as we obtained for the case in which private …rms performed basic research.
